NEC Nijmegen's Tactical Mastery Leads to Extra-Time Victory Over Olympiakos Piraeus

NEC Nijmegen’s 2-1 after-extra-time win over Olympiakos Piraeus at Stadion de Goffert was built on structural clarity and superior control in key zones, rather than sheer volume of chances. Over 120 minutes, Dick Schreuder’s 3-1-4-2 imposed its rhythm on Luis Mendilibar Jose’s 4-2-3-1, gradually turning a level tie in regulation (1-1) into a deserved qualification push in extra time.

NEC’s shape was the defining tactical platform. The back three of D. Fonville, P. Sandler and T. Storm, screened by D. Nejasmic as a single pivot, gave Schreuder both numerical security in rest-defence and a clean base for first-phase buildup. With 603 total passes and 54% possession, NEC consistently constructed from deep rather than playing into chaos. Nejasmic’s role was pivotal: dropping between or alongside the centre-backs to form a situational back four or five in buildup, he allowed the wide central defenders to step into the half-spaces and connect with the midfield line of S. Ouaissa, N. Lebreton, D. Tadic and C. Bischoff.

The wing-oriented “four” in the 3-1-4-2 were less about traditional width and more about staggering between lines. Tadic and Bischoff, nominally central, often received between Olympiakos’ double pivot and back four, forcing D. Garcia and S. Hezze into constant horizontal shifts. This positional play underpinned NEC’s 11 shots inside the box from 16 total attempts, a clear indicator that their possession was translated into high-value territory rather than speculative efforts.

Up front, the pairing of T. Chery and B. Linssen gave NEC complementary reference points. Chery frequently dropped off the last line, linking with Tadic and Bischoff, while Linssen threatened depth and attacked the box. The equaliser at 70’ encapsulated that structure: Linssen finishing a move assisted by Tadic, who had again found a pocket between Olympiakos’ lines. The timing of NEC’s substitutions reinforced this pattern. E. Mor (IN) came on for S. Ouaissa (OUT) at 30’, adding more direct 1v1 threat in advanced areas, while B. Pereira (IN) for P. Sandler (OUT) at 34’ subtly shifted the balance on the right side, giving NEC more aggression in wide buildup without losing the three-at-the-back framework.

Olympiakos’ Tactical Approach

Olympiakos’ 4-2-3-1 was initially coherent and efficient. The double pivot of D. Garcia and S. Hezze sat in front of a back four of Rodinei, P. Retsos, L. Pirola and B. Onyemaechi, with G. Martins, G. Sa and Jota Silva supporting A. El Kaabi. In the first half, they accepted NEC’s territorial advantage, prioritising compactness and transition. Their 10 total shots, with 6 inside the box, came largely from quick vertical attacks, and El Kaabi’s goal at 46’ – immediately after the restart – rewarded that approach: a direct, incisive action rather than a long possession sequence.

However, the structural stability of Olympiakos began to erode through both tactical and disciplinary events. The early substitution of K. Fortounis (IN) for Jota Silva (OUT) at 15’ hinted at a desire for more creativity between the lines, but it also altered the pressing reference on NEC’s left side. Later changes – C. Mouzakitis (IN) for G. Sa (OUT) at 61’, L. Scipioni (IN) for D. Garcia (OUT) and J. Roca (IN) for G. Martins (OUT) both at 72’ – progressively removed key elements of the original defensive spine. By extra time, P. Retsos (OUT) for Z. Smajlovic (IN) at 103’ further disrupted central continuity.

The red card to Kostas Fortounis at 80’ was the decisive tactical hinge. Preceded by a VAR “Card upgrade” check at 79’, the dismissal for “Foul” forced Olympiakos into a deep 4-4-1, with El Kaabi increasingly isolated. With only 505 passes and 69% pass accuracy, their ability to circulate under pressure was already inferior; down to ten men, they could no longer sustain counter-attacks or hold possession long enough to relieve pressure. NEC’s 17 fouls versus Olympiakos’ 19 also reflects how often the visitors were forced into late, reactive defensive actions.

Goalkeeping Performance

In goal, G. Crettaz (NEC Nijmegen) had a relatively quiet but high-stakes night, officially making 1 save. That low number is consistent with NEC’s territorial control and the way their back three plus Nejasmic limited clean looks at goal, despite Olympiakos managing 2 shots on target. At the other end, B. Popovic (Olympiakos Piraeus) made 5 saves, a figure that aligns with NEC’s 7 shots on target and sustained pressure, particularly as the game stretched into extra time. His workload underlined how the match tilted: NEC were not only circulating the ball more, they were repeatedly testing the goalkeeper from inside dangerous zones.

The late-game dynamics highlighted Schreuder’s bench management. The introduction of K. Sierhuis (IN) for C. Bischoff (OUT) at 88’ shifted NEC towards a more striker-heavy configuration, ideal against a tiring, undermanned back line. Although a potential goal by Kaj Sierhuis was disallowed by VAR at 90+4’, his presence still altered the defensive attention of Olympiakos and he later assisted E. Mor’s winner at 95’. Further extra-time changes – J. Monteiro (IN) for B. Linssen (OUT), B. Nuytinck (IN) for N. Lebreton (OUT), and K. Kers (IN) at 106’ – ensured fresh legs across the front and midfield lines, allowing NEC to maintain an aggressive press and high tempo while Olympiakos, a man down, increasingly retreated.

Statistical Overview

Statistically, NEC’s superiority is clear. They led in possession (54% to 46%), total shots (16 to 10), shots on target (7 to 2), and blocked shots (3 to 2), while also completing more passes (603 to 505) at a higher accuracy (76% to 69%). The card profile – NEC Nijmegen: 2 yellow cards, Olympiakos Piraeus: 4 yellow cards and 1 red card, Total: 7 – mirrors the tactical story: the home side dictating terms, the visitors straining to contain them. Even without explicit xG values, the distribution of shots inside the box and on target, combined with NEC’s territorial dominance and extra-time winner, supports the conclusion that Schreuder’s side translated a strong structural plan into a deserved after-extra-time victory.